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1.0 Introduction
In today's competitive marketplace, the quality of a product is becoming
increasingly more important. The informed customer not only weighs the ability of the
product to meet his/her requirements, and the purchase price of the product, but also the
money that must be expended to maintain the function of the product. Hence, lowering
the life-cycle cost of a product will increase its value and attractiveness to the customer.
Reliability and Maintainability greatly influence the life-cycle cost of complex
systems. The more reliable and the more maintainable the product is, the lower its life-
cycle cost will be. Reliability is defined as the probability that an item will adequately
perform its specified purpose for a specified period of time under specified environmental
conditions [1]. Maintainability is defined as the probability thatan item will be retained
in or restored to a specified condition within a given period of time [2]. Researchin
Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) addresses the importance of accurately
quantifying the life-cycle cost of a product and subsequently lowering thatcost.
However, most R&M research has not attempted to utilize R&M analysisas a design
tool. The accepted R&M analysis methodsare used for the evaluation of existing
products based on test data retrieved from the product. These methods relyheavily on
statistical analysis and are relatively accurate. Unfortunately, if the R&Manalysis givesevidence for a design change, the implementation of that change would be very expensive
due to the tardiness its implementation.
The objective of this research is to develop an analytical method to adequately
determine the R&M based life-cycle cost of a product early in its design phase, with the
ability to compare competing designs or design changes and show the effects the
competing designs or design changes may have on the life-cycle cost of the product.
Figure 1 [3] compares company A and company B based on design changes vs. time.
Based on the Concurrent Engineering philosophy, company A is properly run while
company B is not. The presented method was developed to aid the designer in optimizing
the operating costs of the product early in the design process instead making design
modifications after a prototype has been built and tested.
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Figure 1. Design Changes vs. Time
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The complete analytical method that is presented determines three variables for
each component within a system, Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), Mean TimeBetween Unscheduled Removal (MTBUR), and Mean Time Between Maintenance
Actions (MTBMA). Those variables are then used to find the average Line Labor Cost
(LLC) and Shop Labor Cost (SLC) for each component. All the associated labor costs for
the components in the system are summed together to supply the labor cost that is to be
expected in maintaining the system.
The Bleed Air Control System (BACS) from the Boeing 737-300/400/500 was
chosen as a test model for the analysis based on many reasons. First, there is very
detailed life-cycle data available for the 737 so a comparison of actual labor cost versus
the predicted labor cost can be performed. Second, there is a complete Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) available on the 737 BACS that can be easily modeled into a
fault tree analysis. Lastly, the BACS has a history of having high maintenance costs and
being misdiagnosed, so there is a corporate interest in finding a solution to increase the
diagnosability and lower the maintenance costs of the BACS.
Section two of this paper briefly presents a background of reliability and
maintainability analysis and research. Section three describes the 737 BACS and its
operation. Section four presents the entire analysis method that was developed. The
analysis method is separated into five sections, System Modeling, Predict Mean Time
Between Failures, Predict Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions, Predict Mean Time
Between Unscheduled Removals, and Calculate Cost. Section five presents the results of
analyzing four perspective design changes to the BACS. Section six contains the
conclusions and recommendations.4
2.0 Background
Most Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) analytical methods concentrate on
utilizing laboratory test data to provide an adequate estimate of the life-cycle cost of a
product. The Exponential Model was the first widely used distribution in reliability
research [4]. The exponential model is used to solve for the overall survival rate of a
system. The equation utilized in the exponential model is,
S(n) = exp(np) (1)
where S(n) is the survival function, n is the number of time periods of use, and p is the
probability of failure in each time period. Another way of representing the survival
function is in terms of hazard rate and time,
S(t) = exp( A.t) (2)
where A. is the hazard rate, which is the probability of failureper time period and t is the
total time of use. The benefit of the exponential model lies in its ability touse a short
testing time of the product to portray the products ability to survive its expected useful
life. The exponential model has also been adapted to be used withcomponent failure data
[5]. The components are assumed to arranged in seriesor in parallel and formulas for
each are shown respectively below.S(t) =exp[i X(t)dti
i=1 0
(3)
1 S(t) = 111 1exp[S X(t)dtil (4)
t=i 0
There are many other analytical methods used in reliability data analysis that are too
numerous to be adequately presented here, however, they all share a commonality with
the exponential model in that they utilize short time period test data to determine the life-
cycle failure data. Ansell and Phillips [6] have composed a superb text that explains and
demonstrates a good number of the common reliability data analysis methods.
Some R&M researchers have concentrated on specialized areas within the whole
of Reliability and Maintainability. A portion of this research is attempting to predict
measures that influence the life-cycle cost of a product prior to attaining test data from a
prototype. One method being developed is Service Mode Analysis [7]. Service modes
are the ways in which a system may be serviced and Service Mode Analysis is a method
for describing which service modes will impact a particular design and in whatmanner
[8]. This method separates analyzing service modes into two categories, Component-
based service modes and Phenomena based service modes. The superiority of
phenomena based service modes analysis is presented and phenomena based servicecost
is expressed as a function of labor time, labor rate,necessary tools, necessary training,
replacement part cost, and replacement part availability. Later research in thisarea [9,10]
progresses the development of a computer software package to perform serviceability6
analysis. The computer program operates by defining items and their connection to other
items. Each item in a system can be defined as either a component, subassembly,
fastener, or process and its relationship to other items can be described as covers, attaches
to, connects to, engages, or supported by. Repair operations within the program can be
defined as replace, repair, overhaul, adjust/align, or tighten/connect/lubricate. By
assessing all the inputs, a method for analyzing and comparing competing designs is
developed. The latest publication in this research [11] introduces a computerized method
of performing an initial Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), this is combined
with the previous research to increases the predictive ability of Service Mode Analysis.
This research is admirably progressing the predictability of maintainability issues,
however, it does not devote nearly the same effort to predicting reliability related issues
or the diagnostic process.
Much attention is also being devoted to the Diagnosability of a product. The first
research in this area, by Ruff [12], developed form-to-function mapping. Form-to-
function mapping is a method of graphically representinga mechanical system, as shown
in Figure 2.7
Figure 2. Form-to-Function Mapping
The top of the figure represents the function, F, that the system is supposed to perform.
The second row of the figure represents the performance measures, PM, of the system.
The performance measures of a system are the visible indications that the intended
function is or is not being performed. A performance measure could be a sensor
indication or a human observation. The bottom row of figures represent the actual
components, C, of the system. Ruff shows that modifying the interaction between
components and performance measures could increase the diagnosability of the system.
Clark [13] developed a Distinguishability metric for the evaluation a competing
designs based on diagnosability. The Distinguishability metric is a function of the total
number of failure indications, the total number of components, and the number candidate
components per failure indication. Clark utilized the Bleed Air Control System (BACS)
on the Boeing 747 as a test model to verify his results.
Wong attempted to link diagnosability directly with life-cycle-cost [14]. Wong's
method figures the probability of a failure indication occurring multiplied by theaverage8
time to diagnose the failure indication and the hourly maintenance cost yields a cost
estimate based on diagnosability. When the cost to diagnose all the possible failure
indications for a system are summed, a life-cycle cost estimate is arrived at. A similar
method is utilized by Goldberg, Horten, and Rose [15] to determine component reliability
of an electric power feeder.
Murphy [16] developed a method for determining the Mean Time Between
Unscheduled Removal (MTBUR) of system components. Unscheduled removal of
components is separated into two categories, justified and unjustified. The justified
unscheduled removals are equivalent to the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of the
component. An unjustified unscheduled removal is defined as the unscheduled removal
of a component that has not failed. A formula is developed to determine the unjustified
unscheduled removal of components based on the MTBF's of other possible failed
components and the labor involved in component removal.
The largest failing of the for-mentioned diagnosability research, basedon
predictability, is its reliance on historical failure data. This research will utilize muchthat
has been previously developed in diagnosability, but with the addition ofa process to
predict the required failure data.9
3.0 Description of the 737-300/400/500 Bleed Air Control System
Since the 737 BACS is used as a test model to demonstrate the analysis method, it
would be appropriate to introduce the function and layout of the BACS before proceeding
with a description of the analysis method. The function of the BACS isto supply the air-
using systems of the aircraft, such as cabin air conditioning, anti-icing, and engine
starting, with properly pressurized and temperature controlled air. This mission is
accomplished by a series of valves, ducts, controls, and a heat exchanger that take air
from the jet engine compressors. Figures 3, 4, and 5 showa left view, right view, and a
schematic drawing of the BACS respectively.
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Figure 5. 737 BACS SchematicI1
The system is composed of nine major components which are listed below along
with their associated abbreviations.
CHECK: 5th Stage Check Valve
HPSOV: High-Stage Pressure Shut-Off Valve
HREG: High-Stage Regulator
PRSOV: Pressure Regulating and Shot-Off Valve
BREG: Bleed-air Regulator
FAMV: Fan Air Modulating Valve
PCLR: Precooler heat exchanger
FSENS: Precooler temperature sensor
THERMO:450F Thermostat
Table 1. 737 BACS Component List
Under most operating conditions, the air taken from the 5th stage of the
compressor is capable of supplying the proper air to the BACS through the 5th stage
check valve, however, under low engine output conditions the HPSOV is requiredto take
air from the 9th stage compressor to maintain proper air pressure. When the HPSOV is in
operation, the 5th stage check valve prevents any back flow into the 5th stagecompressor.
The HREG monitors the air pressure to control the operation of the HPSOV. The
PRSOV modulates to control the air pressure that is being suppliedto the air-using
systems and the BREG monitors the air pressure to control the PRSOV. The THERMO12
also plays a part in controlling the PRSOV. when the supplied air temperature goes above
450°F, the THERMO limits the amount of air that the PRSOV will supply until the air
temperature drops below 450°F again. The FAMV regulates the amount of air that is
taken engine fan to be run through the PCLR. The FSENS monitors the temperature after
the PCLR exit to control the FAMV. The PCLR is a heat exchanger that uses fan air to
cool the air taken from the compressors before it is supplied to the air-using systems.
The BACS currently has five indications to determine wither the system is
operating properly or not, these indications are above and below normal air pressure in
the BACS read from an analog pressure gauge, a bleed trip off light that illuminates when
the BACS has been shut down to prevent over-temp or over-pressure, and lastly low
cabin pressure and temperature readings from analog gauges are also available. For
modeling purposes, the for-mentioned indications will be referred to by indication
number as listed below.
Indication 1:BACS Pressure High
Indication 2:BACS Pressure Low
Indication 3:Bleed Trip Off
Indication 4:Cabin Pressure Low
Indication 5:Cabin Temperature Low
Table 2. 737 BACS Failure Indications13
Indications 1, 2, and 3 are unique for each engine, however, indication 4 or 5, by
themselves, could be caused by a failure in either engine. A simple way to deal with the
need to check both engines would be to assume that a component is checked one and a
half times instead of just once, one time for the first engine checked and 50% of the time
the other engine must be checked. A more complicated method of dealing with the need
to check both engines is to model each component into the analysis twice, once for each
engine. This research did not consider the need to check both engines for failure
indications 4 and 5 for simplicity reasons and the superiority of either of the two above
mentioned methods of modeling the need to check both engines into the analysis method
was not determined.
With this brief introduction to the BACS concluded, the next section of this paper
will introduce the developed analysis method. More detailed information about the
BACS, such as failure rates and maintenance times, will be supplied as required in the
next section.14
4.0 Analysis Method
The analysis method that was developed contains five distinct operations (System
Modeling, Predict MTBF's, Predict MTBMA's, Predict MTBUR, and Figure Cost) with
a total of 13 steps. The end result of this process will yield an estimation of the labor
costs that are to expected in maintaining the product.
Some assumptions have been made to simplify the analysis method. First, all
components are assumed to be replaceable on the maintenance line and that maintenance
personnel have all the necessary tools and training to perform the removal. Second, only
one component failure is considered to have occurred at any point in time, no multiple
component failures are considered. Third, no passive failures or failures without
indication are considered, and fourth, no indicator failures are considered.
The system modeling phase will convert the FMEA of the system into usable
information for the analysis. This phase will require a complete FMEA for the system to
be analyzed.
The phase to predict the MTBF's of the system components isa two step process.
The first step in this phase requires the engineer to rank all the systemscomponents in the
areas of complexity, use, and working environment. The summation of the components
ranks will indicate which components are more prone to have higher failurerates. The
result of this step is an ordered list of the systems components from higher failurerates to
lower failure rates. The next step in this phase presentsa common failure pattern for15
mechanical systems.This pattern is utilized with the results of the previous step to
determine component Failure Rates (FR), which are inverted to give MTBF's.
The phase to predict MTBMA is a four step process, each of the four steps must
be performed for every unique failure indication and indication combination. The four
steps in this process determine the probability of a failure indication occurring, the order
in which components should be analyzed, the probability of a given component causing
the failure indication, and finally the average Maintenance Rates for the components that
can cause the failure indication. The Maintenance Rates (MR) for each component from
the different failure indications are summed together and inverted to get the MTBMA for
each component. This phase will require the predicted Failure Rates from the previous
phase, the probability that the components failed in a particular mode, and the Average
Time to Perform a Maintenance Action (ATFMA) for each component is assumed to
known or arrived at by some other method.
The phase to predict the MTBUR's is a three step process. The first step in this
phase figures the justified MTBUR for each component, which is equivalentto its MTBF.
The second step in this phase finds the unjustified MTBUR for eachcomponent. The
unjustified MTBUR is found for each component in each different failure mode basedon
the MTBF's of other components and the Line and Shop Labor Hoursper Removal
(LLHPR and SLHPR). All the unjustified MTBUR's for eachcomponent are combined
to get a total unjustified MTBUR. The third step in this phase uses the justified and
unjustified components of the MTBUR to givea total MTBUR for each component in the
system.16
The final phase of this process is to compute the labor cost prediction basedon the
MTBMA, MTBUR, ATFMA, LLHPR, and SLHPR of each component. The line and
shop labor costs are computed for each component and then summed togetherto receive a
total labor cost for maintaining the system.
The initial analysis that was performed on the BACS is used throughout this
section to aid in its explanation.
4.1 Method for System Modeling
The first step that must be performed is to model the mechanicalsystem so that it
can analyzed. To perform this step, a good knowledge of the system layout and function
is required along with a complete FMEA. The results of this stepwere previously
determined by Murphy [16] and the initial methodwas developed by Ruff [12].
The FMEA for the BACS contains numerous amounts of informationthat is not
utilized by this analysis method. What must be derived from theFMEA is the types of
failures that each component can have and what failure indicationsare present when that
type of failure has occurred. For example, when the HPSOV has failed such that itis
stuck in the near open position, indication 1, BACSpressure high, is apparent. If the
HPSOV fails in the full open position, the system will becomeover pressurized and shut
down, so indication 3 will also be associated with this failureas well as indication 1. If
the HPSOV fails in a closed or near closed position, indication 2,BACS pressure low,
will be seen. The probabilities that thecomponent failed in a certain mode was also17
received from the FMEA. For the HPSOV, the probability that the component failed in
the closed or near closed position is 70%, failed in the near open position is 25%, and
failed in the full open position is 5%.
From the FMEA, a fault tree can be constructed to graphically represent the
possible failures of the system and show which failure indications are affected. Figure 6
shows the fault tree analysis for the BACS with the possible failures listed above and
below the failure indications.
prsov pclr bleedpclr fanpclr finpclr fanpclr bleedbrag lo
open leak leak damageclog clog
Figure 6. Fault Tree Analysis for the 737 BACS
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The solid lines represent failure indications that always occur while the dashed lines
represent failure indications that occur only sometimes.S
From the FMEA and the fault tree, it is necessary to form a table that lists all the
possible failure indications that a component can cause and a probability that the
component will fail in the mode that causes the indication. Table 3 demonstrates the list
that as developed for the BACS.
COMPONENT INDICATION # PROBABILITY
HPSOV 1 25%
1-3 05%
2 70%
PRSOV 1 30%
2 70%
PCLR 2 65%
2-4 15%
2-4-5 10%
2-5 05%
4 05%
FAMV 2 25%
2-3 05%
5 70%
CHECK 2 100%
HREG 1 45%
1-3 10%
2 35%
FSENS 2 25%
2-3 05%
5 70%
BREG 1 55%
2 35%
THERMO 2 10%
3 90%
Table 3. 737 BACS Failure Modes19
4.2 Predicting Mean Time Between Failures
The objective of this analysis method is to supply estimated MTBF data for the
system components without having historical or test data. In the conceptual design phase
of a product, historical or test data is typically not available. By utilizing engineering
judgment and common failure patterns, estimated MTBF data can be arrived atvery early
in the design of a product. The absence of an analytical method to predict MTBF datahas
been the largest obstacle in preventing R&M methods being usedas effective design
tools.
The historical MTBF data for the BACS will be compared with the predicted
MTBF data that is developed at the end of this phase.
4.2.1 Step 1
Step 1 yields what is called a failure order with the objective of determining
which components are more prone to failure. It is assumed that thereare three
Macroscopic reasons for component failure (Complexity, Use, andEnvironment). The
more complex a component is, the more likely that it will fail beforea less complex
component. The more that a component is used, the more the likelihood of its failure.
The harsher the environment that a component is operated in, thehigher the probability
that it will fail.20
By ranking the components in a system, in the judgment of the engineer, from best
to worst (1 = best. 2 = next best, ..., n = worst) in the areas of complexity, use, and
operating environment, and summing the three numbers together, a failure order for the
components within a system is established. The components are ranked from highest
numbers to lowest numbers with the higher numbers indicating higher failure rates.
Table 4 shows the analysis performed on the BACS.
COMPONENT COMPLEXUSEENVIRON TOTAL
BREG 9 9 7 25
HREG 8 2 9 19
PRSOV 7 8 6 21
HPSOV 6 1 8 15
FAMV 5 7 1 13
PCLR 2 5 4 11
THERMO 3 4 2 9
FSENS 4 6 3 13
CHECK 1 3 5 9
Table 4. 737 BACS Failure Order Analysis
Table 5 compares the predicted failure order with the actual.21
PREDICTEDACTUAL
1. BREG BREG
2. PRSOV HREG
3. HREG PRSOV
4. HPSOV FAMV
5. FAMV HPSOV
6. FSENS FSENS
7. PCLR THERMO
8. THERMOPCLR
9. CHECK CHECK
Table 5. Predicted vs. Actual Failure Order for the 737 BACS
As can be seen from the chart, this method develops the trend of thecomponents failure
rates. Although this method does not accurately place every component, it doesnot miss
place any component by more than one placeaway from where it should be.
The method for predicting the failure order of systemcomponents has not been
fully developed. It has not yet been determined if complexity,use, and environment are
equally responsible for causing component failure. The initiallydeveloped method
worked well on the BACS, however, further research in thedevelopment of a failure
order is highly recommended. Increasedaccuracy in the failure order will greatly increase
the accuracy of the entire analytical method.4.2.2 Step 2
This step will assign a failure rate to all of the components in the system basedon
the failure order and an estimation of a failure rate from one of the components. Evenon
a newly designed system, there is usually at least one component that has a known failure
rate from its use in a older system or by extrapolating data from a related component
operating in a similar fashion.
Within the R&M industry, there is a general rule of thumb called the 80/20 rule.
This rule of thumb states that 80% of your maintenance expenses fora system will be
caused by only 20% of the components. For example, in a system with ten different
components it can estimated that 80% of the maintenance costs will be caused by the two
most failed components. Again, this is a rule of thumb and is by no means accuratenor
does it give any clue to the actual maintenance cost. However, the fact thata general rule
like the 80/20 rule exists does give evidence to a predictable failure pattern that exists in
mechanical systems. The goal of this section is to utilize historical datato prove the
existence of a predictable failure pattern for mechanical systems and then utilize that
pattern to predict the MTBF's for the BACS components.
The following six figures, figures 7-12, are presented to show the existence ofa
similar failure pattern in mechanical systems. Theywere created from the historical
failure data of six different systems on the Boeing 737. Each dot in the figuresrepresents
a component in the system and the dots were evenly spaced between 0 and 1 along thex-
axis, most failed at 0 to least failed at 1. The normalized failurerate, which is the y-axis,23
for each component was arrived at by dividing the components actual failure rate by the
failure rate of the most failed component in the system. The line that connects the dots in
each graph has no real meaning and is only presented to aid in the visualization of a
pattern.
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Figure 12. Normalized Failure Pattern- 737 Fire Suppressant System
As can be seen from the six figures above, by portraying the historicalfailure data
of the different mechanical systems in thismanner, a similar negative exponential pattern
can be seen. By proving that a predictable failure pattern exists in mechanicalsystems, a
formula can be developed to predict the failurerates of all the components in a system
based on this pattern. An estimated failurerate of one component in the system is
required to provide an actual failure rate prediction instead ofa normalized failure rate
prediction. The failure order that was developed in the previousstep is needed to
properly place the components on the graph. The formulathat was developed for failure
rate prediction is based on exponential functions to producea curve that simulates the
negative exponential pattern shown in the above graphs,it was created by displaying all
the available failure data on one graph and developinga formula to best fit the average of
that data.FRk,.,
FR. =
0 17;
e
eo e
-1
Ee-,
e0
,75 (5)
26
where x is the x-axis position of the component in question, and xi,,, is the x-axis
position of component for which the Failure Rate is known. The x-axis position of all the
components in the system are arrived at, as stated above, by evenly spacing the
components between 0 and one, most failed at zero to least failed at one, following the
failure order that was previously determined. The known component failure rate should
be as far to the left of the curve as possible for accuracy reasons.
Figure 13 shows the prediction curve from the formula developed above and the
actual and predicted failure rates for the BACS. The failure rate for the BREGwas used
as the known failure rate.
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Figure 13. MTBF Prediction
127
By inverting the predicted failure rates from the graph above, a predicted MTBF for each
component is arrived at. Table 4 lists the predicted MTBF's versus the actual MTBF's
for the BACS components.
COMPONENT PREDICTED MTBF ACTUAL MTBF
BREG 5980 5979
PRSOV 14500 20220
HREG 20600 11840
HPSOV 28900 22348
FAMV 39900 21489
FSENS 59600 28232
PCLR 91200 235348
THERMO 214000 45762
CHECK 2720000 471934
Table 6. Predicted vs. Actual MTBF's for the 737 BACS
Although there is error associated with this method, it is expected. Theactual
MTBF data was recovered from threeyears of maintenance logs, while the predicted data
can be arrived at in the conceptual design phase of product development. Theaccuracy of
the predicted MTBF data can be improved by improving the failureorder that was
previously developed.28
The goal of developing predicted MTBF data is to utilize R&Mas a design tool.
the error in the predicted MTBF data above does not hinder this effort. Design toolsare
utilized during the conceptual design phase of a product to determine the superior design
from the multiple alternatives that exist at this point. As will be demonstrated insection
5.0, this goal is accomplished with the errors that are present in the predicted MTBFdata.
4.3 Predicting Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions
For each unique failure indication, there is a diagnosticprocess that must be
performed by the maintenance personnel. The developed methodattempts to simulate
that diagnostic process and yields a maintenance rate for all the possiblecomponents for
that failure indication. The method that is presented must be performedfor each different
failure indication to find the overall maintenancerates, and conversely the MTBMA's, for
each component.
The method used to predict MTBMA isa modified version of what Wong
developed in his thesis [141 The main modificationsto Wong's method is the inclusion
of the probabilities that a component failed ina particular mode to cause a particular
failure indication ( PF, lind). This datawas developed in the system modeling phase and
is listed in table 3. Also, the end result of the method utilizedhere is a prediction of
MTBMA data, while Wong attempted to solve directly forcost.
The average time to performa maintenance action (ATFMA) for each component
is needed to perform this phase of the analysis. TheATFMA data is assumed to be29
known or arrived at by some other method. For the BACS. the ATFMA'swere
developed from historical data by The Boeing Company and are listed below.
COMPONENT ATFMA (hrs.)
HPSOV 0.40
PRSOV 0.89
PCLR 43.00
FAMV 1.33
CHECK 1.00
HREG 2.00
FSENS 0.05
BREG 3.00
THERMO 0.05
Table 7. ATFMA of the 737 BACS components
Other data that is needed is the predicted failure rate data from the previous phase.
The method presented here contains four steps. The first step finds the probability
that a particular failure indication will occur. The nextstep develops an optimum
checking order to diagnose system components and the checking order isutilized along
with failure data to determine the probabilities thata particular component will be the
cause of a failure indication. The final step is to determine the Maintenance Rate for each
component per indication, which is a function of the probability of the indication
occurring multiplied by the probabilities that the previous checkedcomponents in the
diagnostic process have not failed.4.3.1 Step 1
The probability of each failure indication occurring must be computed. The
probability of a failure indication occurring is a function of the failure rates of all the
components that can cause that given failure indication and the associated probabilities
that the components will fail in a mode that will cause the given failure indication. The
formula below [141 is used to find the probability of an indication(Pod).
Pind= 1 (FRiXPFilind))
i =1
(6)
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Where FR, is the failure rate of the component, which is arrived at by inverting the
predicted MTBF that was developed in the previous phase, and PF,I ind is the probability
that the component failed in the mode to produce this given failure indication.
For example, four components (BREG, PRSOV, HREG, HPSOV) can fail ina
mode that causes indication 1, BACS pressure high. The probability of indication 1
occurring in 1000 flight hours is presented.
4
PindI= 1 n (1_ (FRiXPFiIind1))
i=1
Where i=1 is BREG, i=2 is PRSOV, i=3 is HREG, and i=4 is HPSOV3!
P,,,, =1 01 (0 .1673)(0 .55)X1(0.0688)(0.30)X1 (0.0487)(0.45)X1(0.0346)(0.25)))
P,,,d, = 0.13773
4.3.2 Step 2
The checking order index must be established to simulate the trouble shooting
process. The variables of failure rate and maintenance time where selected because they
are the biggest factors that influence a mechanics choice to check one component before
another. This step will determine the order in which components should be checked
based on probabilities of failure and maintenance times. The formula [14] for the
checking order index is presented.
(FR. XPF I ind)
COjund =
ATFMA (7)
Where ATFMA is the Average Time For Maintenance Action. A checking order index
must be determined for each candidate component for a given failure indication. The
components are then assumed to be checked in order from highest checking order index
to lowest checking order index so the analysis method can have a repeatable result. Some
situations may determine that failure rate or maintenance timesare more important than
the other variable. In this situation, the engineer should weight the important variableto
his/her informed discretion. No weighting was used for the analysison the BACS.32
The example for indication 1 is presented:
(FRDREGXPFBREGI indl)(0.1673)(0.55)
COBREG = 0.0306
ATFMABREG 3.00
(FRpRsoVFPRSOV XP I indl)(0.0688)(0.30)
0.0232
ATFMApRsov 0.89
COpRSOV
(FR HREGXP FHREGI indl)(0.0487)(0.45)
0.0109 COHREG
ATFMAHREG 2.00
(FR HPSOV XP F Hpsov I indl)(0.0346)(0.25)
0.0216 CO =
ATFMAHpsov 0.40
So the order in which the components should be checked for indication 1 is, BREG:
PRSOV: HPSOV: HREG.
4.2.3 Step 3
The probability that a given component is thecause of the failure indication must
now be determined by the formula [14] listed below.
Pcomplind
(FRcompXPF,,pIind)
unchecked(FR 'XPF,I ind)
(8)33
Aside from the inclusion of the probability of a component failing ina particular mode,
this formula was further modified from Wong to only consider uncheckedcomponents.
When a component is checked, it is determined if that component is thecause of the
failure or not. If the component is not the cause of the failure, then thenext component in
the checking order must be checked. Since the previously checkedcomponent is known
to be in working order, it is no longer a function in the equation.
In the example, once the BREG is checked and if it is found to be in working
order, the probability that the PRSOV is the failed component isnot dependent on the
BREG since it is now a known quantity. Beloware the probabilities that each of the
candidate components for failure indication 1 have in being the failedcomponent based
on the unchecked components.
(0 .1673)(0 .55)
PBREGI1 = 0.64 (0.1673)(0.55)+ (0.0688)(0.30) + (0.0346)(0.25) + (0.0487)(0.45)
(0.0688)(0.30)
= 0.40
(0.0688)(0.30) + (0.0346)(0.25) + (0.0487)(0.45)
(0.0346)(0.25)
= 0.28
(0.0346)(0.25) + (0.0487)(0.45)
PPRSOVI1
PHPSOV41
4.3.4 Step 4
This step develops the Maintenance Rates of thecomponents within the system.
Determining the maintenance rate fora component is a function of the probability that the34
failure indication occurred and the probabilities that all the previous components in the
checking order were not failed.
MRcomplind=(mind) n Pcomplind)
checked
(9)
The maintenance rates per 1000 flight hours for the components thatare relevant
to failure indication 1 are listed below.
MRBREGII = 0.1377
MRpRsovii = (0.1377)(1 0.64) = 0.0496
MRHpsovii = (0.1377)(1 0.64)(1 0.40) = 0.0297
MRHREGII =(0.1377)(1 0.64)(1 0.40)(10.28) = 0.0214
These four steps are repeated for every different failure indication. The
Maintenance rates for each component are then summed together and invertedto produce
the total MTBMA for each component in the system. The results for the BACSare listed
in Table 8.35
COMPONENT PREDICTED MTBMA ACTUAL MTBMA
BREG 4500 N/A
PRSOV 5590 10515
HREG 18000 4000
HPSOV 5300 3154
FAMV 31500 9000
FSENS 5330 31544
PCLR 94900 27800
THERMO 29700 N/A
CHECK 2720000 N/A
Table 8. Actual vs. Predicted MTBMA for the 737 BACS
where N/A indicates that the information was not available.
The results that were developed by this method seem fairly erred when compared
to the actual data. MTBMA data is not nearly as important to maintenance cost issuesas
MTBF or MTBUR data, however, MTBMA data isnecessary to fully use the Line Labor
Cost Formula that is utilized by this method. In the absence of another,more accurate,
method to determine MTBMA, the presented methodwas utilized so a fully predicted
cost analysis could be performed.36
4.4 Predicting Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removal
This analysis method was developed by Murphy [16]. The only deviation from
Murphy's method is the utilization of Predicted MTBF's instead of Historical MTBF's
for the components in the system.
4.4.1 Step 1
Murphy separates unscheduled component removals into two categories, justified
and unjustified. The justified unscheduled removals are equivalent to the failurerates of
each component, so the MTBUR is equal to the MTBF for each component [16].
MTBUR II comp = MTBFI comp (10)
4.4.2 Step 2
The unjustified unscheduled removal of a component is dueto misdiagnosis of the
system, it represents the removal of a component that was thought to be failed but in
actuality was not. Murphy [16] presents a formula that specifies unjustifiedMTBUR as a
function of the MTBF's of the other candidate components fora failure indication and the
probability of detection.MTBURui iind =
Where,
other
MTBF
comp.,
(FRi)(PF;Iind)
PD
(LLHPR + SLHPR)
=
(FR;XPFilind)
(LLHPR + SLHPR)
4.4.3 Step 3
(12)
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When both justified and unjustified MTBUR'sare known, the actual MTBUR can
be calculated [16] as shown below.
MTBUR,,, =
1
1 1
MTBURJMTBUR,,,
The MTBUR results for the BACSare listed below.
(13)38
COMPONENT PREDICTED MTBUR ACTUAL MTBUR
BREG 4490 4654
PRSOV 8120 15664
HREG 8900 8455
HPSOV 15800 9996
FAMV 29600 13520
FSENS 27000 21256
PCLR 81900 90987
THERMO 172000 19957
CHECK 1000000 471934
Table 9. Predicted vs. Actual MTBUR for the 737 BACS
The MTBUR results that were developed from the predictedMTBF data are
equivalent to the MTBUR data thatwas developed by Murphy [16] using historical
MTBF data. The MTBUR data is the main influencein figuring maintenance costsso it
is a promising occurrence to get similar resultsfrom predicted MTBF dataas is received
from actual MTBF data.39
4.5 Labor Cost Evaluation
Once the MTBF's, MTBUR's, and MTBMA'sare known for each component in
a system, a cost analysis can be performed. The formulas for Line Maintenance Cost and
Shop Maintenance Cost where developed by the Boeing Company,however, Boeing
utilized the formulas to figure the cost foran airplane fleet per year. The formulas
utilized here were simplified to solve for costper 1000 flight hours of a single plane.
4.5.1 Step 1
The formula for computing line labor maintenancecost is as follows.
( Line Labor Cost = (hourly line labor cost)
K
LLHPR)
MTBUR)4.
ATFMA))
MTBMA ))
(12)
4.5.2 Step 2
The formula for computing shop labor maintenancecost is as follows.
Shop Labor Cost = (hourly shop labor cost)( SLRPR (13)
MTBUR40
43.3 Step 3
The total labor cost is found by summing the Shop Labor Cost and LineLabor
Cost together for all the components in the system. Historically, theBACS requires a
labor cost of $517.00 per 1000 flight hours and the finalcost developed from the
prediction method presented is $416.00 per 1000 flight hours,an error of 20%.
Although the error of the result is fairly large, the resultingcost analysis is still of
value. It must be remembered that the final laborcost was fully predicted by the analysis
method. Detailed historical data or laboratorytest data is not required. As will be
demonstrated in the succeeding section, the analysis method issensitive to prospective
changes in the system as well. This ability makes the method usefulas a design tool to
compare the up front cost of a design change or a competing design ideaversus the life
time savings that the change will produce.41
5.0 Analysis of proposed changes to Bleed Air Control System
For an analysis method to be useful as a design tool, it must becoarse enough to
yield reasonable results without precise data, yet sensitive enoughto pick-up small
changes and produce the effect that the change will induce. This sectiondemonstrates the
methods ability analysis design changes. Four prospective changesto the BACS are
examined in this section. Each design change is consideredindependently of the other
design changes
5.1 Design Change #1, PRSOV Failed Closed Indication
This design change adds a mechanical switchto the PRSOV that is depressed
when the valve is in the closedor near closed position. The mechanical switch gives
another failure indication in the system to inform thepilots if the PRSOV is stuck in the
closed position. This changewas modeled by adding a failure indication 6 to represent
the PRSOV stuck in the closed position. This designchange effectively removes the
PRSOV from trouble-shootingprocess for failure indication 2 since the switch (indication
6) will inform the mechanic if the PRSOV has failedin this mode or not.
By removing the PRSOV from indication 2, theprobability of that indication
occurring dropped from .1562 to .1135per 1000 flight hours and the probability that the
components prior to the PRSOV in the checking orderwere the failed components were
slightly increased. This had the effect of raisingthe MTBMA's for all the components in42
the BACS and greatly increasing the MTBMA for the PRSOV from 5585 hoursto 10230
hours. A similar change in MTBUR is produced by the addition of the PRSOVswitch.
There is a slight increase in MTBUR for all components and the MTBUR forthe PRSOV
changes from 8199 hours to 11486 hours. The increases to the MTBMA's and
MTBUR's amounted to a 6% labor cost savings for the BACS.
5.2 Design Change #2, Monitor Pressure Data to DeterminePRSOV Failure
This design changes involves the addition ofa computer method to monitor the
bleed air pressure gauge to determine PRSOV failureor not. This change was modeled
as supplying failure indication 7, PRSOV failed.
The changes to the system analysis werevery similar to Design Change #1. The
MTBUR's and MTBMA's were reduced further and the MTBURand MTBMA for the
PRSOV were both changed to 14532 hours, thesame as the MTBF. Since there is now
an indication that directly determines PRSOV failure, there isno need to even check the
component unless it is known to be failed. A 10% laborcost savings was produced by
this design change.
5.3 Design Change #3, External Markeron PRSOV to Indicate Valve Position
This design change placed an indicatoron the outside of the PRSOV that showed
valve position. Although this change doesnot give another failure indication to the43
system, it does aid in the diagnosis of the system. This change would allow diagnosis of
the PRSOV on physical inspection alone and prevent the needto remove the valve for
inspection. This was modeled by reducing the ATFMA for the PRSOVto 0.05 hours.
The effect that this change had on the calculationswas changing the checking
order for the failure indications that involved the PRSOV. The effect thatthis had was
lowering the MTBMA of the PRSOV from 5585 hours to 3402 hours,since it is now first
in the checking orders that it is involved in. The MTBMA for theother components
increased or decreased slightly. This is because the change in thechecking order changed
the probabilities of the checked components being the failedcomponents. The labor cost
savings that were introduced from this design changewere 1.8%.
5.4 Design Change #4, Monitor Current to BREGto Determine Failure
This design change calls for the introduction ofa computer logic card to monitor
the current being supplied to the BREG. By monitoringthe current, it can be determined
if the BREG has failed or not. Thiswas modeled in the formula by adding indication 8,
BREG failure, to the possible failure indications.
As with the PRSOV in design change #2, this designchange effectively removes
the BREG from being a candidate in indication1 and indication 2. Since the BREG is the
most failed component, the isolation of thiscomponent drastically lowers the probability
of indication 1 and 2 occurring. The probabilities ofindications 1 and 2 occurring change
from 0.1377 and 0.1562 to 0.0504 and .1038respectively, also, the probabilities of the44
checked component being the failed component noticeably increase with theBREG
removed from the equation. The MTBUR's of all the componentsare raised as well due
to the reduces ambiguity of the system. These effects combine to inducea 18.5% labor
cost savings with this design change.45
6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
The end result of this research is a tool to aid in the design ofa product based on
life-cycle cost. The developed method figures the life-cycle laborcost that is to be
expected while maintaining the product. The developed method is also capableof
comparing competing designs or design changes basedon cost. Although the inclusion of
the capital costs of the product was not part of this research, it is relativelyeasy to
quantify and should be used to fully analyze life-cyclecost savings. This method
provides the designer the ability to makemore informed decisions earlier in the design
process, so design changes can be made in the most inexpensive manner possible.
The assumption of knowing the SLHPR, LLHPR, ATFMA, and havinga detailed
FMEA in the early stages of the design isa fairly large one. However, the Service Mode
Analysis [7] that is being developed addresses these variables andissues in a predictive
manner. With the inclusion of a method that predicts the variables thatwere assumed
known in this research, the predictive ability of this researchincreases greatly.
Further research in this area should concentrate inmany different areas. The
method that was developed here is fairly long and tediouswhen performed by hand.
Developing this method into a computerprogram would increase its ease of use and
greatly decrease the analysis time required. The inclusion ofa Service Modes Analysis
would also be of benefit in the future. The inclusion ofService Modes Analysis would
effectively predict everything impacting the life-cyclecost of a product with the bare
minimum of assumptions. Lastly,more research should be placed into the assigning ofthe failure ranking, step 2. Increased accuracy in thisarea would greatly increase the
accuracy of the entire method.47
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